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There is a lot of talk about making our food system more “sustainable,”
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sustainable products to the market, and for its willingness to pay more for
these options. However, while economists normally predict that higher
prices lead profit-minded suppliers to enter a market to meet a new and
growing demand, this transition is not occurring at the pace one would
expect.
This Article argues that land tenure status—whether a farmer rents or
owns his/her land—prevents the adoption of sustainable practice. Renters
adopt fewer sustainable practices on the land, not because there is anything
inherent in farmland rental that results in inferior environmental
stewardship, but because legal agreements between the landlord and tenant
do not incentivize sustainable practices. In order to feed the eco-consumer
and motivate sustainable practice adoption, renters need incentives to adopt
sustainable practices. Incentives to produce sustainably are vital given that
10% of farmers are due to retire in the next 20 years, placing more land in
tenancy and into the hands of landlords with little farming experience.
Academics have given little attention to asking how sustainable
practices will be preserved in the next century with these land-tenure trends
in mind. This Article uniquely combines classical economic theory with
U.S. Census of Agriculture farming practice data to expose gaps in existing
policy and incentivize renters to adopt sustainable practices. In an era of
limited federal regulatory power, this Article focuses on private sector
solutions found in contracting, conservation initiatives, certification
systems, ecosystem markets, and conservation easements.
I. INTRODUCTION: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR “SUSTAINABLE” FOOD
The sustainable shopper is here. While food consumers predominantly
shop with taste, safety, and price in mind,1 more admit to reading labels,2
and to aligning food purchases with personal values.3 Eco-labeling is on the
rise as “a recent Consumer Reports survey of 1,050 people found that
pesticides are a concern for 85 percent of Americans.”4 More and more
1. See Food Demand Survey (FooDS), OKLA. ST. U. (July 16, 2017),
http://agecon.okstate.edu/files/August%202017.pdf (utilizing a monthly online survey, FooDS follows
consumer trends on “safety, quality, and price of food at home and away from home with particular
focus on meat demand”). FooDS’s sample size consists “of at least 1,000 individuals, weighted to match
the US population in terms of age, gender, education and region of residence.” Id.
2. Nutrition 101: Consumers Actually Do Read Product Labels, FORBES (July 20, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thehartmangroup/2016/07/20/nutrition-101-consumers-actually-do-readproduct-labels#73ae122a45e6.
3. See DELOITTE, CAPITALIZING ON THE SHIFTING CONSUMER FOOD VALUE EQUATION 1–2
(2016) (detailing how consumers’ “traditional drivers” have been evolving).
4. Eat the Peach, Not the Pesticide, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/natural-health/pesticides/index.htm.
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consumers are discovering that agricultural practices reduce soil
productivity, raise levels of water and air pollution, increase water scarcity,
destroy insect species, contribute to climate change, reduce genetic
diversity by using genetically modified crops,5 alter human systems with
toxic food residues, and decrease antibiotic resistance.6 As more violations
of environmental standards reach the popular press, social media, and the
courtroom,7 consumers are searching for foods grown using sustainable
practices––“method[s] of harvesting or using a resource so that the resource

5. In November 2015, the FDA announced “the first approval for a genetically engineered
animal intended for food, AquAdvantage Salmon.” Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA
Takes Several Actions Involving Genetically Engineered Plants and Animals for Food (Nov. 19, 2015),
https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170721213214/https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Pre
ssAnnouncements/ucm473249.htm. The FDA declined petitions from Earthjustice and several other
environmental groups requesting that the agency first prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
before approving AquAdvantage Salmon for market. Letter from Leslie Kux, Assoc. Comm’r of Pol’y,
Food & Drug Admin., to Khushi Desai, Earthjustice (Nov. 19, 2015) (on file with Vermont Law
Review).
6. See generally SUSAN SCHNEIDER, FOOD FARMING AND SUSTAINABILITY 645 (2011)
(describing briefly the history of antimicrobial resistance); see also Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply,
Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 686, 689–90, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that the Clean Air Act does not preempt
common law claims alleging negligence, nuisance, and trespass against a whiskey distiller); Nat. Res.
Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 760 F.3d 151, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2014) (challenging the
FDA’s refusal to hold a hearing prior to allowing drug manufacturers to sell antibiotics for use in animal
feed because of the dangers posed by such antibiotics in the food supply); Mendoza v. Monsanto Co.,
No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2016 WL 3648966, at *1, *5 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2016) (denying a motion by
Monsanto to dismiss a lawsuit brought by an individual who claims to have developed non-Hodgkin
lymphoma as a result of using Monsanto’s Roundup product); Sheppard v. Monsanto Co., Civ. No. 1600043, 2016 WL 3629074, at *1, *11 (D. Haw. June 29, 2016) (denying Monsanto’s motion to dismiss
a claim that Roundup caused the plaintiff’s non-Hodgkin lymphoma); Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2:13-cv-02095, 2016 WL 4717986, at *20 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2016)
(concluding that farming activities resulted in a violation where those activities were either “not part of
an established and ongoing farming activity,” or where those activities impact the flow of water in a
wetland); M. Sean High, Legal Settlement: Syngenta Agrees to Pay $1.2 M. for Selling Misbranded
Pesticides, PA. ST. AGRIC. L. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.pennstateaglaw.com/2016/09/agricultu
ral-law-weekly-reviewseptember_22.html (“[T]he agency has reached a settlement agreement with
Syngenta Crop Protection . . . for allegedly violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act through the repackaging, selling and distribution of unregistered and misbranded pesticides.”).
7. While historically environmental challenges to food production centered on water
pollution, new litigation challenges the use of antibiotics in animals, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014), the use of genetically modified crops, Briseno v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138
S. Ct. 313 (2017), and new sources of air pollution from agricultural activities, Waterkeeper All. v.
EPA, 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Many of these cases do not implicate farmers, but some do (i.e.,
nuisance claims). For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the environmental
organization challenged FDA’s refusal to hold a hearing prior to allowing drug manufacturers to sell
antibiotics for use in animal feed because of the dangers posed by such antibiotics in the food supply.
760 F.3d at 157–58; see also Kux, supra note 5 (questioning the FDA’s failure to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the approval of food-grade, genetically altered salmon).
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is not depleted or permanently damaged.”8 While some consumers go to
great lengths to search for foods and ingredients,9 others use smartphone
applications that scan bar codes and identify sustainable ingredients as they
shop.10
Food retailers are guided by research showing that companies can
expect a healthy return on investment from environmental and socially
sustainable products and that consumers, especially millennials, are the
“most willing to pay extra for sustainable offerings.”11 Private certifications
such as “organic,” “cruelty-free,” “natural,” “fair trade,” “hormone free,”
“pesticide free,” and “free range”12 have made it to mainstream retail
environments. Retailers exemplifying this trend include Walmart’s example
to offer and source more sustainable foods,13 and Amazon’s recent Whole
Foods acquisition.14 Amazon is a retailer for the masses, whereas Whole
Foods is a retailer tailored to eco-shoppers.15

8. Sustainable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2007).
9. See Lauren R. Hartman, First-Ever Plant Based Foods Association Forms, FOOD
PROCESSING (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.foodprocessing.com/industrynews/2016/first-ever-plant-based
-foods-association-forms/ (demonstrating that consumers can eat less meat or meat alternatives, from
tofu and tempeh to dairy replacements and vegan foods because, this year, a plant-based foods
association formed to promote plant-based protein products).
10. Make Smart Shopping Choices from Your Smartphone with Sustainable Shopper App,
CINCINNATI ZOO & BOTANICAL GARDEN (Apr. 18, 2012), http://cincinnatizoo.org/blog/2012/04/18/ma
ke-smart-shopping-choices-from-your-smartphone-with-sustainable-shopper-app/; see also John Still,
Top 10 Sustainable Food Apps, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/sustainable-food-apps-smartphone-menu (listing sustainable food apps for consumer use).
11. Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability Is a Shopping Priority, NIELSEN (Nov. 5,
2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sustainabilit
y-is-a-shopping-priority.html.
12. See THE TRUE COST (Untold Creative, LLC, 2015) (demonstrating mainstream awareness
of fair trade by showing a company’s adoption of this certification).
13. Dan Charles, Can Anyone, Even Walmart, Stem the Heat-Trapping Flood of Nitrogen on
Farms, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/21/54422945
8/can-anyone-even-walmart-stem-the-heat-trapping-flood-of-nitrogen-on-farms (“According to one
study, carried out by the consulting group Deloitte, greenhouse emissions from fertilizer are the biggest
single piece of the global warming price tag for almost half of the top-selling items on the shelves at
Walmart.”).
14. Nick Wingfield & Michael J. de la Merced, Amazon to Buy Whole Foods for 13.4 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/business/dealbook/amazon-wholefoods.html.
15. See Lauren Thomas, Amazon’s 100 Million Prime Members Will Help It Become the No. 1
Apparel Retailer in the US, CNBC (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/19/amazon-to-bethe-no-1-apparel-retailer-in-the-us-morgan-stanley.html (“Brands are plugging the department store
‘leaky bucket’ hole with growth on Amazon.com.”); Environmental Stewardship: Our Green Mission,
WHOLE
FOODS
MARKET,
https://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/mission-values/environmentalstewardship/green-mission (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (explaining how Whole Foods’ passion for
healthy food coincides with its passion for a healthy planet).
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As consumers and retailers demand more sustainable foods,
economists would normally predict that supply would follow: that farmers
would be eager to produce for these value-added markets.16 This is not
necessarily the case, however. For some farmers, there are barriers to
producing more sustainable food—barriers that extend beyond the usual
agricultural production constraints, such as access to inputs like seeds and
technology.17 One seldom discussed barrier to producing more sustainable
food is a legal constraint: the relationship the farmer has with the land,
otherwise known as the “land tenure” status.18 “The word tenure comes
from the Latin tenir, which means ‘to hold,’” and the dominant forms of
land tenure in the United States are private ownership and tenancy, each
with its own laws, customs, and legal arrangements.19
The problem is that tenants, in contrast to private owners, adopt fewer
sustainable practices on the land, not because there is anything inherent in
farmland rental that results in inferior environmental stewardship, but
because landlord-tenant legal agreements do not typically incentivize
sustainable practices. There is historical support for this incentive structure.
Most of our history held the ideal tenure status to be full owner
operatorship, reasoning that tenants and absentee landlords, without strong
roots to the land, will not take as good care of the land as landowner
operators.20 This view was based on the Dust Bowl experience of the late
1930s, when severe dust storms and drought coupled with a lack of winderosion prevention, dryland-farming techniques, and severely damaged the
ecology of American prairies.21 Over time, farmers either voluntarily
abandoned their land, or lost it to bank foreclosure, leading to “the largest
migration in American history. By 1940, 2.5 million people had moved out
of the Plains states; of those, 200,000 moved to California.”22 The
16. Jonathan C. Carlson, Strengthening the Property-Rights Regime for Plant Genetic
Resources: The Role of the World Bank, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 111–12 (1996).
17. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the challenges of adopting sustainable farming
for farm tenants who rent the land they farm).
18. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The
Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419,
436–37 (2004).
19. ROBIN KOHANOWICH ET AL., FARMLASTS PROJECT: AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE: A
CURRICULUM FOR BEGINNING FARMERS AND FARM SEEKERS 3, www.uvm.edu/farmlasts/FarmLASTS
AgLandTenure.pdf (last modified Feb. 24, 2010).
20. See id. at 4–5 (tracing the “Jeffersonian ideal” of dispersed private land ownership through
American history).
21. See Timeline: The Dust Bowl, PBS,
[hereinafter
Timeline:
The
Dustbowl],
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features /dust-bowl-surviving-dust-bowl/ (last visited
Apr. 20, 2018) (describing the effects of the dust storms and drought on fertility and quality of soil).
22. Mass Exodus From the Plains, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/feature
s/surviving-the-dust-bowl-mass-exodus-plains/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
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prevailing thought was that drought and storms, huge migration, and
resulting high rates of absentee ownership and tenancy, all exacerbated the
loss in valuable topsoil, the fertile base upon which successful agriculture is
grown. Subsequently, land tenancy was negatively perceived and actively
discouraged.23
Following the Dust Bowl, “[c]hanging land tenure patterns” from
absentee landlords and tenants to farm owner-operators “were considered as
important as soil conservation programs in stopping the serious rates of soil
erosion.”24 “Congress declare[d] soil erosion ‘a national menace’ in an act
establishing the Soil Conservation Service in the [U.S.] Department of
Agriculture” (USDA) to “develop extensive conservation programs,” some
of which incentivized farmers with payments.25 The program included
“strip cropping, terracing, crop rotation, contour plowing, and cover
crops . . . .”26 Congress also established the precursor to the Farm Services
Agency (FSA), a program intended to help tenant farmers purchase
farmland.27 States also passed laws to incentivize land ownership including
bans on long-term leases.28 These policies entrenched land ownership and
conservation practices, which made incorporating sustainable methods a
land tenure issue.
While some policies were rooted in the past, “the times they are achangin’.”29 Tenancy re-emerged in the 1940s with corporations purchasing
more land and renting it to farmers.30 Today, “[a]pproximately 39 percent
of the 911 million acres of farmland in the contiguous 48 States is rented.”31
In the next twenty years, two dominant trends will bring even more land
into tenancy.
First, a generational shift will drive more acres to tenancy. According
to the USDA Survey on Land Ownership and Transfer (the USDA Survey),
landowners “55 and older account for nearly 80 percent of all owner23. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Timeline: The Dust Bowl, supra note 21.
26. Id.
27. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
28. Id.
29. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
(Columbia Records 1964), https://bobdylan.com/songs/times-they-are-changin/.
30. See, e.g., Christopher P. Rodgers, Rural Development Policy and Environmental
Protection: Reorienting English Law for A Multifunctional Agriculture, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 259, 285
(2009) (“The rules of [the Agriculture Act of 1947] therefore reflect the agricultural imperative, and
stress the need to maintain optimum levels of efficient production on tenanted holdings.”).
31. DANIEL BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, TENURE, AND
TRANSFER, at iii (2016), [hereinafter USDA REPORT], https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/7
4672/60298_eib161.pdf?v=42607.
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operated land; almost 70 percent of all farmland owned by non-operating
landlords is owned by people who are 65 and older.”32 Furthermore, “[t]en
percent of all land in farms is expected to be transferred during 2015–19,”
and for the first time ever, farmers will be transferring land to nonfarmers.33 “Landowners anticipate selling 3.8 [percent] of all farmland, with
2.3 percent to be sold to non-relatives,” and “[6.5 percent] is expected to be
transferred through trusts, gifts, and wills.”34
Second, despite the percentage of land held in tenancy remaining
relatively stable over time at between 30–40% of acres in production,35 the
composition of landlords renting land to farmers will continue to change.
Among the acres available for rent, 87% of the land is rented by “nonoperator landlords” without farming experience (individuals, corporations,
partnerships, and trusts), while only 13% of the land is rented by “owneroperator landlords” who already operate farms.36
Given these two up-and-coming trends in land tenure, surprisingly little
academic attention has been given to asking how sustainable practices will
be preserved into the next century. This Article uniquely combines
economic theory with farmland-practices survey data to highlight tangible
and successful legal mechanisms to incentivize farmers, consumers, and
regulators to facilitate sustainable agricultural policies.37 The Article
proceeds as follows. Part II defines the economics of farming. Part III
describes sustainable practices and the way in which land tenure impacts
practice adoption. Part IV focuses on solutions found in the public and
private sectors. In an era of limited federal regulatory power,38 a range of
private solutions are presented, which include: altering the lease contract
and expanding private conservation initiatives, certification systems, and
32. Visualizing U.S. Farmland Ownership, Tenure, and Transition, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/data-visualizations/other-visualizations/visualizing-usfarmland-ownership-tenure-and-transition/.
33. Id.
34. Id. (emphasis omitted).
35. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 5.
36. Id. at 17, 31 n.9.
37. See id. at i, v (analyzing the results of the 2014 Tenure, Ownership, and Transition of
Agricultural Land (TOTAL) survey, which was administered by USDA’s ERS and National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) as part of a special follow-up to the 2012 Census of Agriculture
to collect data from the owners and operators of agricultural land).
38. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (aiming to reduce
regulation and control regulatory costs by requiring each agency to begin taking steps to cut back on
regulations); see also Andrew Soergel, Trump Executive Order Embraces “One-In, Two-Out”
Regulatory
Scheme,
U.S.
NEWS
WORLD
REP.
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-01-30/trump-executive-order-embraces-one-in-two-outregulatory-scheme (describing the “one-in, two-out” policy, where “any additional regulation under
consideration by the government can only be approved if two existing regulations are stripped away”).
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ecosystem markets. Part V concludes, reiterating a need for incentives in
conservation-farming practices.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF FARMING
Despite our nation’s strong agrarian roots, only 2% of the U.S.
population produces food.39 Farming has become a consolidated enterprise;
farms are much larger today with fewer individuals operating them. A few
statistics highlight these trends. In 1900, about 40% of the total population
lived on a farm compared to today, where the figures show only about 2%
remain on farms.40 Today there are approximately two million farms
(compared to the six and seven million farms in 1935), among which
60,000 farms account for approximately 72% of the value of agricultural
output value.41
While farming operations have changed significantly over this century,
some things remain the same. Farmers continue to be economic actors who
respond to economic forces and always operate under uncertainty.
Vulnerable to weather, disease, and pests, farmers consistently face “price
or market risk (e.g., fluctuations in input costs and output prices), financial
risk (e.g., shifts in interest rates and credit access), institutional risk
(involving government policies), and human risk (including farmer health
and labor issues).”42 Farmers adopt sustainable practices when those
practices maximize the farm operation’s economic viability while
minimizing its legal liability.43

39. Fast
Facts
About
Agriculture,
AM.
FARM
BUREAU
FED’N.,
https://www.fb.org/newsroom/fast-facts (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
40. See William Petit, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is It Setting the Stage for
Significant Change in U.S. Agricultural Subsidy Use?, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 127, 134 n.79 (2004) (“In
the 1930’s, 25 percent of the population lived on the nation’s 6 million farms; today, our 2 million farms
are home to 2 percent of the population.”); Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007,
38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 345, 359 (2006) (describing the changing demographics in American agriculture
over time).
41. Petit, supra note 40, at 134.
42. See David B. Oppedahl, Taming Agricultural Risks, FED. RES. BANK CHI. (Jan. 2014),
https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedhle/y2009ijann258a.html (identifying risks associated with agricultural
production, including but not limited to market risk, institutional risk, and human risk).
43. Andres Trujillo-Barrera et al., Understanding Producers’ Motives to Adopt Sustainable
Practices: The Role of Expected Rewards, Risk Perception, and Risk Tolerance, 43 EUR. REV. AGRIC.
ECON. 359, 363 (2016).
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A. Economic Viability
In some corporate models, firms are measured by a “triple bottom line”
(economic profit, environmental sustainability, and social responsibility),44
but few farmers are ever measured along these dimensions. From a business
standpoint, farmers focus on preserving their operation, which means
reducing costs and raising the quality and yield of their output.45 They
maximize profits for the crops they decide to grow and the desired level of
inputs (known as “factors of production,” or land, capital, labor, water,
pesticides, and fuel, among others).46 These basic components of a farmer’s
agricultural-production-function also consider seasonality, geography, and
sources of technical change, risk, and uncertainty. For instance, “[n]ew
businesses are springing up that promise to tell farmers how and when to
till, sow, spray, fertilize or pick crops based on algorithms [and often
drones] using data from their own fields.”47 New technologies are being
developed that aim to improve yields and sustainability through improving
soil health using fewer chemicals.48 While online marketing startups such as
Farmingo, Full Circle, Barn2Door, and Good Eggs give farmers an online
marketplace to sell their goods, many say that the e-commerce farm-toconsumer market is saturated and not worth the cost.49 Ultimately, with or
without technological sophistication, the calculus is the same: for an

44. Triple Bottom Line, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/143016
63.
45. See generally Loren W. Tauer, Do New York Dairy Farmers Maximize Profits or Minimize
Costs?, 77 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 421, 421 (1995) (stating that most economists conclude that farms, as
rational businesses, seek to minimize costs and maximize outputs to sell).
46. JOHN M. ANTLE, PESTICIDE POLICY, PRODUCTION RISK, AND PRODUCER WELFARE: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS 36–37 (1988).
47. Ludwig Burger, Digital Farming Could Spell Shake-up for Crop Chemicals Sector,
REUTERS (May 2, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-farming-digital-idUKKCN0XV0KP.
48. See Louisa Burnwood-Taylor, Microbe-Based Food and Agriculture Products Company
BiOWiSH Raises $5m Series B, AGFUNDER NEWS (May 4, 2016), https://agfundernews.com/microbebased-food-ag-products-company-biowish-raises-5m-series-b5796.html?utm_source=AgFunder+Update
s&utm_campaign=fc97554162-AgFunder_Weekly_Newsletter_May05&utm_medium=email&utm_ter
m=0_7b0bb00edf-fc97554162-97956713 (describing BioWish’s microbial soil treatments that reduce
the amount of fertilizer needed); see also Sara Sjolin, Monsanto Aims to Tackle Looming Global Food
Crisis, MARKETWATCH (May 23, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/monsanto-aims-to-tacklelooming-global-food-crisis-2016-04-06 (“[In] the world’s biggest field-test program of seeds laced with
microbes, [Monsanto found] that corn yields increased by four bushels per acre, or about 2.2%. Yields
on soybeans increased by 1.5 bushels per acre.”).
49. Steve Holt, Does Farm Tech Help Farmers?, CIVIL EATS (May 5, 2016),
http://civileats.com/2016/05/05/does-food-tech-help-farmers/?utm_source=AgFunder+Updates&utm_ca
mpaign=fc97554162-AgFunder_Weekly_Newsletter_May05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_7b-b
b00edf-fc97554162-97956713.
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operation to be economically viable, it cannot spend more revenue than it
makes.
Land is the leading input and the leading expense in a farmer’s
operation. Current land prices make land scarce. Land represents 80% of
the cost of running a farm; a defining characteristic of current agriculture is
a “fierce competition for land.”50 Land does not turn over very frequently,
and because it takes more land to make a profit today, farmers are
consistently under pressure to find more farmland (through renting or
buying) to remain in business.51
According to National Agricultural Statistics, land prices are currently
at an all-time high—more for cropland, and less for pastureland.52 Factors
that affect farmland values are: expected net returns, interest rates,
government programs, capital investment in structures, non-farm demand,
inflation, lending policies, other investments, speculation, trade,
technology, site characteristics, and environmental issues.53 Land prices
also vary by geography. “In some areas of the Northeast, farmland values
are ten times the national average.”54
The urbanization of agricultural lands, or farmland conversion, also
raises land costs. “[U]rban and suburban sprawl” has transferred “over 30
million acres” to development since 1970,55 raising land prices and making
it nearly impossible for potential farmers to enter into this business.56 In
addition, while land is the principal cost to the farming operation, other
costs have risen recently. The largest cost increases are for fertilizer and
seed, with projections of $569 per acre for corn and $324 per acre for
soybeans.57
New farmers are at a clear disadvantage. First, as the demand for land
drives up the land price, beginning farmers trying to access farmland must
contend with very high land costs.58 Next, not only are rental rates
50. EDWARD COX, THE LANDOWNER’S GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE FARM LEASING 20, 20 (2010),
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/leopold_pubspapers/70.
51. Id.
52. See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE,
U.S. DATA tbl.1, 8 (2009), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/usv1.pdf
(showing the progression of the increasing market value of cropland between 1978 and 2007).
53. See David Oppendahl, Address at the U.S. Dep’t Agric. Agric. Outlook Forum (Feb. 24,
2011) (PowerPoint available in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Outlook Forum archives,
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/106149) (listing factors that affect farmland value).
54. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
55. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 39.
56. Id.
57. David B. Oppedahl, Agricultural Markets and Food Price Inflation–A Conference
Summary, FED. RES. BANK CHI. (Jan. 2009), https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedhle/y2009ijann258a.html.
58. Id.
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prohibitively high, but evidence that farmers are renewing their leases also
limits their chances for acquiring land.59 Finally, even if a beginning farmer
is able to get land, he/she will need to rent land from multiple landlords to
achieve the number of acres required to make the farming operation
economically viable.
B. Legal Liability
While farmers have flexibility regarding the inputs they select and the
crops that they grow, farmers need to comply with regulatory requirements
related to food safety and environmental protection, as well as tax and tort
obligations.
Food safety considerations have the highest potential to interfere with a
farmer’s decision to adopt sustainable practices.60 Farmers need to ensure
that sustainable practices do not come at a cost of compromising food
safety standards set in the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011
(FSMA).61 Foodborne illnesses are a serious concern in the United States
because they are responsible for ailing 47.8 million and hospitalizing
127,839 Americans each year.62 Recent high-profile foodborne illness
outbreaks have resulted in civil and criminal liability for farmers63 while
59. See USDA REPORT, supra note 31 (noting that there is not a lot of new land coming to
market).
Ten percent (93 million acres) of all land in farms is expected to be transferred
during 2015–2019, most of which (6 percent) will change hands through gifts,
trusts, or wills. Of all land expected to be transferred, only about a quarter (21
million acres) will be sold between nonrelatives. Another 14 percent (or 13
million acres) is anticipated to be sold from one relative to another. While the
amount of farmland expected to be sold is relatively small, some of the land
transferred through trusts, wills, and gifts may then be sold by the new owners,
bolstering the supply of land available for purchase.
Id.(emphasis omitted); see also COX, supra note 50, at 21 (discussing short-term and long-term leases).
60. See, e.g., Margot J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety and
Environmental Protection in a Cooperative Governance Regime, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 399, 400–
02 (2015) (describing the trade-offs between food safety and environmental regulations and detailing the
difficulty of asking farmers to bear additional regulatory costs).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 350(h)(3)(E) (2012) (as added by Food Safety and Modernization Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3899).
62. Burden of Foodborne Illness: Findings, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
63. United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 940 n.18 (N.D. Iowa 2015)
(detailing how the prosecution cited several recent cases where defendants were sentenced to prison or
confinement after being convicted under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, including the Jensen Farms
defendants); United States v. Parnell, No. 1:13-cr-12, 2013 WL 2387714, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 30,
2013) (stating that Parnell faced a 76-count indictment for introducing adulterated food into interstate
commerce); Helena Bottemiller Evich, Prosecutions Scare Food Industry, POLITICO (Oct. 9, 2013, 5:05
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/prosecutions-scare-food-industry-098011 (discussing
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historic outbreaks have illustrated the devastating effects an outbreak can
have in terms of market loss and litigation.64
Federal and state regulations, private litigation and supply chain
obligations (such as providing third-party food-safety certifications)
pressure farmers to adhere to the highest food-safety practices65––often at
the cost of sustainable practices. When farmers are not contractually
obligated to supply sustainably grown food, they are, at a minimum,
obligated to produce food that is contractually safe for consumption. The
result is that most farmers will prioritize food-safety standards over
sustainable practice adoption.
For example, from a farm-level perspective, while growers want to
protect soil and water quality while supporting wildlife habitats on the farm,
they need to ensure that crops are free from contamination by fecal matter
(which may introduce pathogens that can cause foodborne illnesses) in
order to comply with private sector audit programs that contractually
require them to meet certain food-safety and management practices.66 In the
wake of a 2007 E. coli outbreak linked to spinach contaminated by fecal
matter from roaming feral pigs, California leafy greens growers entered into
a voluntary agreement—the Leafy Greens Marketing Act (LGMA)––to
raise food-safety standards and preempt federal regulation.67 According to
most accounts, resistance from small farms and sustainable agriculture
nearly killed the agreement, but the agreement passed, while establishing
standards “for evaluating safety of production in fields in California and

recent criminal prosecutions following food contamination); Lawsuit Blames Death on Dole Plant
Salad,
Listeria
Outbreak,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(June
2,
2016),
https://apnews.com/6a854a6b82fd4bbabe224c7c86ab5d95 (discussing civil lawsuits filed against Dole
in connection to a listeria outbreak).
64. See Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: How Legal Liability Informs Food Safety
Regulation, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 723, 728 (2013) (noting that an outbreak of microbial foodborne
illness can have several adverse consequences). For example, Odwalla’s 1996 fruit juice recall resulted
in “a voluntary product recall (valued at $12.5 million), a 17% drop in revenue during the first six
months after the [recall], a record $1.5 million federal fine for interstate shipment of an adulterated food
product . . . , and twenty-one personal injury lawsuits.” Id.
65. See Food Demand Survey, supra note 1, at 2 (demonstrating how consumers pressure
farmers through consumer interest in issues such as Salmonella and E. coli, which become more
prevalent when there are foodborne illness outbreaks); Jayson L. Lusk & Susan Murray, New Tool
(FooDS) Identifies Consumers’ Views on Food Safety, 29 CHOICES 1, 5 (2014) (referencing consumers’
interest in GMOs, Salmonella, and E.coli makes farmers feel an increased pressure to adhere to
consumer expectations in the food-safety arena).
66. K. LOWELL ET AL., PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT, SAFE AND SUSTAINABLE: CO-MANAGING
FOR FOOD SAFETY AND ECOLOGICAL HEALTH IN CALIFORNIA’S CENTRAL COAST REGION 61, 80
(2010).
67. Marks, supra note 64, at 729, 780.
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Arizona . . . .”68 “[G]rowers report[ed] yielding to tremendous pressure
from auditors, inspectors, and other food safety professionals to change onfarm management practices in ways that not only generate[d] uncertain
food safety benefits, but also create[d] serious environmental
consequences.”69
While this account illustrates an example of farmers prioritizing foodsafety risks over sustainable practice adoption, this does not imply that
farmers will always arrive at this solution. A supply chain obligation to
supply sustainable foods or to maintain sustainable practices may prioritize
sustainable practice adoption to the level of food safety. Similarly,
environmental protection regulations have the potential to raise sustainable
practice adoption to the level of food safety. For example, some federal
programs require compliance with sustainable practices, such as the over
23.8 million acres enrolled in the USDA Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP).70 A contractual obligation to maintain acreage in this program will
sway growers to adopt sustainable practices while maintaining a required
FSMA baseline of food-safety practices.
III. SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
Consumers often criticize conventional farmers for not farming
sustainably, not holding a long-term perspective, and generally not farming
in a way that ensures that croplands can be farmed and crops can be
produced in perpetuity without diminishing yield, quality of crop, or health
and resources of the soils.71
A. Examples of Sustainable Practices
Farmers who want to adopt sustainable practices often refer to the 1990
Farm Bill definition,72 where sustainable practices imply examining the

68. See Michaela Tarr Oldfield, Enactment of the Food Safety Modernization Act: The US FDA
Within the Context of Interacting Public-Private Governance Processes, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 488, 493
(2015) (describing the controversy behind the LGMA’s adoption).
69. LOWELL, supra note 66, at 5.
70. CRP
Enrollment,
U.S.
DEP’T
AGRIC.
(Mar.
31,
2016),
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/Conservation/PDF/CRPEnrollmentMar2
016DotDensity.pdf.
71. See, e.g., George Wuerthner, How ‘Cheap Food’ Industrial Agriculture Is Destroying
America, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.organicconsumers.org/news/howcheap-food-industrial-agriculture-destroying-america (criticizing the agricultural industry for its
environmental impacts).
72. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 3103 (2012).
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entire farm operation—all of the inputs and outputs to the farm endeavor—
for practices that are environmentally friendly, socially responsible, and
economically viable across time considering the needs of future
generations.73 Still, many wonder whether environmentally friendly,
socially responsible, and economically viable food is possible from a dayto-day management perspective.74
On the farm, conservation practices take several forms, 75 and can be
divided into two main categories: operational and permanent (with some
overlap in the categories).76 “Most conservation practices are intended to
decrease soil erosion” and preserve topsoil because “[t]opsoil is the most
fertile part of the land holding the most nutrients for growing crops, and it
takes up to a thousand years to develop one inch of new topsoil.”77 Farmers
want to prevent soil from washing into nearby creeks and streams
(disrupting the quality and flow of water), and from blowing away in an
area that is overgrazed or not secured by plants.

“[S]ustainable agriculture” means an integrated system of plant and animal
production practices having site-specific application that will, over the longterm—(A) satisfy human food and fiber needs; (B) enhance environmental quality
and the natural resource base upon which the agriculture economy depends;
(C) make the most efficient use of nonrenewable resources and on-farm resources
and integrate, where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls;
(D) sustain the economic viability of farm operations; and (E) enhance the quality
of life for farmers and society as a whole.
Id.
73. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that stewardship of both natural and human
resources includes: “working and living conditions of laborers, the needs of rural communities, and
consumer health and safety both in the present and the future”). The farm produces private and public
goods like food, rural amenities (hunting, tourism, landscape enjoyment), environmental and cultural
services, habitat for wild animals and plants, and biodiversity. Id. Sustainability also means finding
sources of income outside of growing crops, but farmers must consider zoning. Id.; see also Cent. Or.
Landwatch v. Deschutes County, 367 P.3d 560, 567 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (ruling against a zoning change
because petitioners did not intend to establish a private park as a park, but instead wanted to establish a
private park solely for use as “a commercial event venue”).
74. See Bryan Weech, Is Sustainable Beef All Talk and No Action?, BEEF MAG. (Apr. 24,
2017), http://www.beefmagazine.com/sustainability/sustainable-beef-all-talk-and-no-action?NL=BEEF02&Issue=BEEF-02_20170503_BEEF-02_491&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_5_b&utm_rid=CPG02000
002565167&utm_campaign=16659&utm_medium=email&elq2=836cfe04c504422a90e872d869264277
(noting from a management perspective that “it is reasonable to expect the current focus on
sustainability will last for the foreseeable future”).
75. See Patricia E. Norris & Sandra S. Batie, Virginia Farmers’ Soil Conservation Decisions:
An Application of Tobit Analysis, 19 S.J. AGRIC. ECON. 79, 80 n.2 (1987) (defining “[c]onservation
practices” to include the use of “terraces, sod waterways, stripcropping, critical area planting, pasture or
hayland establishment and/or management, cover crops, and tree planting”).
76. Michael D. Duffy, Conservation Practices for Landlords, AG DECISION MAKER (Iowa St.
U.), Apr. 2014, at 4, http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1425&context=agdm.
77. Id.
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An operational conservation practice can be implemented on a year-byyear basis and can be used one year and not the next (e.g., contour buffer
strips, contour farming, cover crops, crop rotation, managed grazing (such
as rotational grazing), nutrient management, integrated pest management
and residue management, like mulch and no-till).78 Meanwhile, a permanent
conservation practice will remain in place until it is removed or altered
(e.g., diversion, field borders, grade stabilization structure, grassed
waterways, riparian buffer strips, stream bank and shoreline stabilization,
terraces, water and sediment control basin, and windbreaks). 79
Since farming is ultimately a business, the extent to which farmers
adopt conservation measures depends largely upon the profitability of these
practices80 rather than social or personal rewards.81 In an effort to maximize
their economic viability while minimizing their legal liability, farmers
considering sustainable practices calculate in terms of a farmer’s capital
expenditures, operation and maintenance expenditures, as well as
opportunity costs like foregone income from crops.82 If a conservation
practice increases profitability––such as increasing yield or decreasing
production costs––while not increasing risk (liability risk, regulatory
compliance risk, market risk, etc.), it has adoption potential.83 Another
consideration is that “[f]or some practices, a considerable portion of the
78. See id. (referring to landlords’ ability to establish conservation practices).
79. Id.
80. Daniel Clay et al., Sustainable Intensification in the Highland Tropics: Rwandan Farmers’
Investments in Land Conservation and Soil Fertility, 46 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 351, 354
(1998); see also Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 79 (describing previous studies where factors
influencing the voluntary enrollment in conservation practices included financial assistance, risk,
attitudes, and income, among others); Linda Lee, The Impact of Landownership Factors on Soil
Conservation, 62 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1070, 1071 (1980) (discussing the balance of income and
conservation practices); Sean P. Neill & David R. Lee, Explaining the Adoption and Disadoption of
Sustainable Agriculture: The Case of Cover Crops in Northern Honduras 4, 12 (Cornell U., Dep’t
Agric., Working Paper No. 99-31, 1999) (explaining that a Honduran farmer’s abandonment of maize in
favor of cattle was possibly due to the profitability of the practice). For examples of studies refuting this
theory, see B. Smit & J. Smithers, Adoption of Soil Conservation Practices: An Empirical Analysis in
Ontario, Canada, 3 LAND DEGRADATION & REHABILITATION 1, 9 (1992) (discussing that farmers are
more willing to adopt “agricultural innovations” if there are “higher economic returns” for the farmer);
Keith O. Fuglie, Conservation Tillage and Pesticide Use in the Cornbelt, 31 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED
ECON. 1, 145 (1999) (describing why farmers adopt conservation tillage systems). For a study that finds
no significant relationship, see Peter J. Nowak, The Adoption of Agricultural Conservation
Technologies: Economic and Diffusion Explanations, RURAL SOC., Summer 1987, at 208, 211, 214–15
(introducing the theory that conservation measures do not result in higher returns).
81. Trujillo-Barrera et al., supra note 43, at 376.
82. See generally PA. ST. U., COVER CROPS FOR CONSERVATION TILLAGE SYSTEMS 2 (2006),
https://extension.psu.edu/cover-crops-for-conservation-tillage-systems (identifying the costs—e.g.,
additional operating costs or lost profits from competing crops—that farmers should consider when
determining the profitability of cover crops as a sustainable practice).
83. Trujillo-Barrera et al., supra note 43, at 363.
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fixed costs can be paid with cost share funds,” with the amount of funds
depending upon the practice and varying by county. 84
B. Sustainable Practices and Land Tenure Status
How do landowners and renters differ in their decision to adopt
sustainable practices? In other words, in what way does land tenure affect a
farmer’s daily decisions on input use, seasonal planting decisions, annual
farmland rental decisions, and multi-year decisions about ownership and
maintenance of land, machinery, and facilities?
In the United States, land ownership is the dominant land tenure status
followed by tenancy. The USDA Survey provides valuable trends on land
tenure status to better examine the constraints under which land owners and
tenants operate.85 According to the USDA Survey, over 60% of agricultural
land is operated by owners of that land, with the remaining 39% of land
operated by renters.86 There are two types of landowners. “Operator
landlords” are landowner farmers and own 20% of rented land (70 million
acres).87 “Non-operator landlords” own 80% of rented acres88 but are not
actively involved in farming themselves, and have little to no farming
experience.89 These absentee landowners consist of older, retired, often
female individuals or inheritors who live increasingly farther away from the
land they rent.90

84. See Duffy, supra note 76, at 5.
85. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 5, 6.
86. Id. at iii, 5. On farms with annual sales of over $25,000, 60% of farm operators lease some
or all of their land. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 6. If gross sales exceed $25,000, 78% of
farm operators are full owners; 16% are part owners; and 7% are tenants. Id. If gross sales are between
$25,000 and $500,000, 40% of farm operators are full owners; 49% are part-owners; and 11% tenants.
Id. If sales exceed $500,000, 40% of farm operators are full owners; 50% are part owners; and 10% are
tenants. Id.
87. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at iii, 17.
88. Id. at iv, 17.
Non-operator landlords are more likely than operator landowners to acquire land
through inheritance. Operator landowners acquired over 50 percent of their
owned land through a purchase from a nonrelative, while non-operating landlords
acquired over 50 percent through an inheritance or gift. Of the 45 percent of nonoperator landlords who have no prior experience with farming, more than twothirds either inherited or received their land as a gift. Thus, although a
considerable fraction of non-operator landlords have not farmed, some familial or
personal relationship to farming may exist.
Id. at iv (emphasis omitted).
89. Id. at iii.
90. See id. at 17, 38 (explaining that female landlords and retired farmers, for example, make
up 38% of non-operator landlords).
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While some believe that farmers who rent are less likely to adopt
sustainable practices compared to those who own the land—either because
they lack historical or emotional ties to the land, or are less sensitive to the
history, “the sense of accomplishment, the sacrifice, and the pride
embodied in the land”91—the adoption of sustainable practices comes down
to finances. Tenants and owners have conflicting incentives regarding
conservation and production practices due to their financial interests in
short-term or long-term economic returns from the agricultural land. Tenant
farmers are less likely to have an incentive to adopt practices that improve
the long-term sustainability of the operation because tenants are short-term
contractors who operate under a shorter time horizon (the lease).92
Lease duration influences tenant decision-making in several ways.
First, because leases are yearly,93 this affects the time horizon under which
farmers calculate investments. Normally, a rational individual calculates the
income effects of a proposed conservation program over time and compares
these effects to his/her expected income over the same time without
conservation measures. For example, farmers sharing similar erosion
problems may reach different conservation investment decisions depending
on individual time preference or discount rates and the length of their
planning horizon. “A lower discount rate and a longer planning horizon are
thought to encourage conservation decisions by increasing the present value
of expected net revenues and by allowing sufficient time to recoup
conservation investments.”94
Econometric studies confirm these anecdotal findings. Many studies
highlight financial constraints to conservation adoption. First, landowners
who typically have higher income rarely face these constraints. For
instance, one study of owner-operators found that higher farm income
levels are associated with lower rates of erosion resulting from a
combination of less erosive land and more conservation practices.95
91. LeeAnn E. Moss & Bernie Erven, Extension Factsheet on Managing Landlord-Tenant
Relationships: A Strategic Perspective, OHIO ST. U. EXTENSION (Apr. 1, 2001), https://conservationc
onnect.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/tenant-landowner-relationship.pdf.
92. See COX, supra note 50, at 20–21 (finding that sustainable practices result in extra costs for
tenants).
93. See USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 26 tbl.3 (stating that 70% of farm leases are a yearly
lease).
94. Lee, supra note 80, at 1070 (noting the effect of discount rates and planning horizons on
the likelihood of adopting conservation decisions).
95. Id. at 1074.
Nationally, only 40% of cultivated cropland owned by the most affluent
landowners is classified as having an erosion hazard, while 59% of cultivated
cropland owned by the lowest income group is labeled erosion prone. . . . In terms
of management, 60% of cultivated cropland owned by landowners with net farm
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Farmers who spend more on conservation measures typically also perceive
soil erosion on their land, have larger farms, lower debt levels, higher
income, and a conservation plan in place.96 Second, tenants have lower
income and spend less on conservation practices. One study showed that
farmers who spend less on conservation measures are farmers who rent
land, work off-farm, and have higher debt levels.97 These studies show that
programs designed to encourage the voluntary adoption of conservation
practices should consider the special needs of limited-resource farmers.
Lease type has been identified as an institutional barrier to sustainable
practice adoption.98 Short-term leases and fixed-cash leases both reduce a
farmer’s incentive to maintain the productivity of rented land and the
likelihood of investing in conservation practices.99 Lease terms that define a
cost-sharing arrangement between the tenant and the landlord may prevent
practice adoption when the tenant bears most of the cost for a long-term
benefit to the landlord.100 When land is rented, the landlord and tenant often
share costs. Depending on whether the land improvement costs are longterm or short-term, the landowner or the tenant may pay for them.101 “Often
the conservation practices benefit the landlord, but in certain cases the
tenant also will benefit due to factors such as improved yields, easier
farming conditions and less potential for water damage.”102 Soil nutrients,
for example, are one cost shared by the parties because they have both a
short-term and long-term effect.103 Costs can be split in half, or the landlord
pays for activities that have continuing benefits on the soil while the tenant
income greater than $50,000 had minimum tillage or residue practices in effect,
while 47% of such land owned by those with net farm incomes of less than
$3,000 had these practices at the national level.
Id.; see also The Great Depression, the Family Farm and the New Deal, PBS,
https://vermont.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/5e632ed9-8d7c-464a-bd4c-05a62208205e/the-great-depr
ession-the-family-farm-and-the-new-deal/#.Wnp5DKinE2w (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (describing FSA
aid under the New Deal).
96. Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 84.
97. Id. at 84, 87.
98. See Lee, supra note 80, at 1071 (listing lease arrangements in addition to absentee
ownership, small operating units, high property taxes, and lack of credit facilities).
99. Id. at 1075; see also Meredith J. Soule et al., Land Tenure and the Adoption of
Conservation Practices, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 993, 995–96 (2000) (noting that fixed-cash agreements
are less likely to be associated with conservation practices that provide benefits over the long-term).
100. See Rusty Rumley, Agricultural Contracts and the Leasing of Land, NAT’L AGRIC. L.
CTR.,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/rumley_contractsandleasesppt.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (describing crop-share leases and allocation of short-term and longterm costs).
101. Improving Your Farm Lease Contract, IOWA ST. U. EXTENSION & OUTREACH (Iowa St. U.
Extension) May 2017, at 5, https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/html/c2-01.html.
102. Duffy, supra note 76, at 5.
103. Rumley, supra note 100.
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is responsible for chemicals that have an immediate effect, such as nitrogen
(and also insect and weed control).104 Costs for cleaning waterways and
increased nutrient contamination are directly associated with soil erosion,
but neither the tenant nor the landlord bear these costs.105
Other factors also affect conservation practice adoption. Even if tenants
wanted to adopt sustainable practices, they often lack decision-making
authority for long-term investments. The USDA Survey shows that
“[l]andlord input to farm management decisions on rented land varies by
type of decision” and by type of landlord.106 Tenants make decisions on
short-term farm management practices, such as cultivation practices, crop
choice, and harvesting, with no input from landlords.107 Meanwhile,
landlords are more likely to be involved in long-term decisions, such as
adopting permanent conservation practices and participating in Government
programs.108 Landlord input also varies by type of landlord: operator
landlords provide more input in farm management decisions than their nonoperating counterparts, perhaps because they have more farming
experience.109
Given these different sets of constraints, some sustainable practices are
more likely to be adopted by tenants for their ability to lower farming costs.
Some improvements in agricultural technologies and production practices
have substantially lowered the energy use, water use, and greenhouse-gas
impacts of food production per unit of output over time.110 Many farmers,
including tenants, use conservation tillage (using minimum tillage or no-till
practices)111 for its potential for increased returns (a negative expenditure)
104. Id.; see also Rusty W. Rumley & Benjamin L. Thomas, Written Sugarcane Leases:
Protecting the Interests of the Farmer and Landowner, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR. 1, 3,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/rrumley_leasesfactsheet.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 22, 2018) (describing the typical roles tenants and landlords assume in managing soil).
105. Duffy, supra note 76, at 5.
106. See USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at iv (describing the role of landlords in short-term and
long-term decision-making).
107. Id. at 29.
108. Id. at 30–31.
109. See id. (contrasting non-operator and operator land-management decisions).
110. See J. L. Capper, The Environmental Impact of Beef Production in the United States: 1977
compared with 2007, 89 J. ANIMAL SCI., 4249, 4256–57 (2011) (comparing the per unit inputs, outputs,
and emissions of beef production in 1977 and 2007); Michael Cavigelli et al., US Agricultural Nitrous
Oxide Emissions: Context, Status, and Trends, 10 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T, 537, 545 (2012)
(describing how efficiency in crop and meat production has lowered nitrogen dioxide emissions).
111. See Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 80 n.3.
Minimum tillage is the minimum soil manipulation necessary for crop production
or meeting tillage requirements under the existing soil and climate conditions.
No-tillage is a method of planting crops that involves no seedbed preparation
other than opening the soil for the purpose of placing the seed at the proper depth.
Id.
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over conventional tillage practices.112 Additionally, some farmers rely on
seeds and crop rotation to help save costs; for instance, biotechnology has
led farmers to use cover crops and practice more no-till farming.113 Nearly
all corn, wheat, and soybean farmers avoid monocultures by practicing crop
rotation.114 Studies confirm that conservation tillage is likely to be used by
renters, but only under these conditions: (1) when practices do not require
large investments of time and capital;115 (2) when they are production
enhancing;116 (3) when renters are not bound by certain types of leases;117
or (4) when landlords require them to invest in sustainable practices.
Conservation tillage is less likely to be used as farm income, age, off-farm
income, and soil erosion increase.118 This is supported by a more recent
study that found that Iowa farmers who own their land are more likely to
rotate crops, but less likely than full tenants and part-owners to use
conservation tillage.119

112. See Catherine L. Kling, Can Voluntary Adoption of Agricultural Practices Achieve
Hypoxic Zone Reduction Goals, AGRIC. POL’Y REV., Spring 2014, at 5, 8,
https:/lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=agpolicyreview (noting that, in 2008,
farmers in 12 states were asked to voluntarily align their farming practices with the Hypoxia Task Force
recommendations, which aimed to reduce the level of oxygen depletion in the Gulf of Mexico through
“conservation tillage, reduced nitrogen application rates, increased use of side dressing, cover crops,
wetlands, buffers, controlled drainage, and bioreactors”). Of the methods recommended by the Hypoxia
Task Force, “conservation tillage and alterations in nitrogen application rates and timing have the
greatest potential to increase profitability at the farm level. . . . However these practices alone are likely
to achieve only a modest (less than 9%) reduction in nutrients, far short of the 40% reduction goal for
agriculture.” Id.
113. See Jorge Fernandez-Corneio et al., Pesticide Use in U.S. Agriculture: 21 Selected Crops,
1960–2008, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. RES. SERV. ECON. INFO. BULL., No. 124, May 2014, at 6, 30,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43854/46734_eib124.pdf (explaining the use of
conservation practices relative to pesticide use); see also John Horowitz, et al., “No-Till” Farming Is a
Growing Practice, USDA ECON. RES. SERV., ECON. INFO. BULL., No. 70, Nov. 2010, at 17 (reporting
an increase in no-till operations in the U.S.); Edward D. Perry et al., Testing for Complementarity:
Glyphosate Tolerant Soybeans and Conservation Tillage, 98 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 765, 767 (2016)
(providing testing for conservation practices).
114. Soil Tillage and Crop Rotation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Apr. 4, 2017),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/crop-livestock-practices/soil-tillage-andcrop-rotation/.
115. Sarah Varble et al., An Examination of Growing Trends in Land Tenure and Conservation
Practice Adoption: Results from a Farmer Survey in Iowa, 57 ENVTL. MGMT. 318, 326 (2016)
(explaining how conservation tillage is used by farmers to decrease their energy and labor costs).
116. See Lee, supra note 80, at 1071 (noting the tendency of certain leases to reduce landlord
income).
117. See Soule et al., supra note 99, at 994–96 (explaining that conservation tillage is profitable
in the short term and is used by renters with short-term leases that have few constraints).
118. Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 85.
119. Varble, supra note 115, at 318.
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IV. A PAGE FROM THE SUSTAINABLE FARMER’S PLAYBOOK
Given the constraints under which tenants operate, there are many
public and private sector mechanisms to incentivize farmers—tenants and
landowners—to adopt sustainable practices on the land. Table 1 introduces
the recommendations discussed in the following subsections.
Table 1: Recommendations for Incentivizing Tenants to Adopt
Sustainable Practices
Public Sector Recommendations





Expand Access to Federal Conservation Programs
Expand Funding and Enforcement for Certifications that
Incentivize Sustainability
Integrate Conservation Goals into Other Federal Programs
Expand State Legislation Favoring Conservation (e.g.,
Minnesota Agricultural Water Control Certification Program)
Private Sector Recommendations



Reform Lease Contracts
o
Longer Leases
o
Add Environmental Stipulations or Sustainability
Provisions
 Industry Collaborations and Other Contracting Opportunities
That Make Sense
 Enhance Private Conservation Initiatives
A. Public Sector Recommendations
1. Expand Tenant Access to Federal Conservation Programs
Conservation programs emerged during a time when land ownership
was preferred over land tenancy, a sentiment that continues to this day.
Federal programs encouraging farmers to adopt sustainable practices
mobilized in the 1940s as a result of the Dust Bowl and high rates of
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tenancy.120 At that time, “[c]hanging land tenure patterns were considered
as important as soil conservation programs in stopping the serious rates of
soil erosion.”121 Federal programs were developed “to help tenant farmers
purchase a farm of their own” and “resettle farm families who had lost their
farms through foreclosure. . . . [T]he federal Farm Security Administration,
under the Tenant Purchase Program, put 12,000 landless families onto a
farm of their own.”122 As a result, land ownership predominated, both
numerically and in terms of acres farmed, well into the 1970s and 1980s.123
The problem was that, over time, farmers gradually lost control over
farm prices, and received a smaller share of consumer dollars spent on
agricultural products. Indebted to banks and vulnerable to seasonal and
other risks, economic pressures led to an enormous loss of small farms and
farmers.124 From 1987 to 1997, more than 155,000 farms were reportedly
lost leading to the collapse of rural communities.125 Federal government
programs expanded once again following this crisis, supporting farmers
with policies such as crop insurance, renewable fuel mandates, the
conservation reserve program, and land conversion restrictions.126
Given the uncertainty of agricultural production decisions, farmers
have come to rely on the programs created during these eras—government
farm policies (price support programs which stabilize revenue streams) and
conservation regulations (which provide subsidies for sustainable
practices)—to sustain their operations, especially in downward cycles.127
Just as landowners have come to rely on these streams of income, they have
also come to rely on a model of farming rooted in ownership.
The problem today, given changes in land tenure and a renewed
interest in sustainable practice adoption, is that most federal government
programs target agricultural landowners directly, with few programs
extending to tenants. For most federal conservation programs, the eligible
120. See KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5 (describing post-Dust Bowl tenancy
policies).
121. Id.
122. Id. “Today’s Farm Services Agency, which provides agricultural credit and credit
guarantees, is the modern-day offspring of the Resettlement Administration. The Resettlement
Administration was renamed the Farm Security Administration in 1937, the Farmer’s Home
Administration in 1946, and the Farm Services Agency in 1991.” Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. (describing the burst of agriculture’s speculative bubble).
125. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 39.
126. See Morrow, supra note 40, at 351 (discussing the 1996 FAIR Act, which expanded
farmers’ rights).
127. See Christopher R. Kelly & John S. Harbison, A Guide to the ASCS Administrative Appeal
Process and to the Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions, 36 S.D. L. REV. 14, 16 n.11 (1991) (“The large
federal farm program expenditures in the late 1980s meant that many farmers depended heavily on farm
program payments for their farm income.”).
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party to receive a financial payment is an “agricultural producer [who has]
legal control over the land for the entire contract period”128 of one to ten
years, with one exception.129 Through the USDA, the federal government
oversees several voluntary conservation incentive programs, the main
programs being the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), and the parallel structure
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP).130 These programs
primarily consist of cost-sharing arrangements for constructing or adopting
new conservation practices, payments for practices that provide
environmental benefits, and rent payments for retiring highly erodible
land.131
The CRP is designed to prevent the erosion of topsoil and reduce water
runoff and sedimentation. Farmland owners who convert land used for
agricultural production to resource-conserving vegetative covers (typically
grasses or trees) receive rental payments for a 10- to 15-year term, or every
year the land is enrolled in the CRP.132 Farmers enrolled in the CRP do not
qualify for enrollment in the CSP, a voluntary incentive-based working
lands program. The CSP is the largest conservation program in the United
128. Ed Cox, Conservation Law, DRAKE U. AGRIC. CTR. (Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter
Conservation Law], http://sustainablefarmlease.org/conservation-law/.
Cost-share share funding is limited to 75 percent but is usually funded at
approximately 50 percent. Cost-share limitations are higher for beginning,
limited-resource, and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, who may
receive up to 90 percent of the estimated cost for certain conservation practices.
The maximum payment a participant can receive is $300,000 for all EQIP
contracts entered during any six-year period. However, if the NRCS Chief
determines a project to have special environmental significance this limitation
may be waived to a maximum of $450,00 [sic]. Limits for assistance with organic
production are established at $20,000 per year and $80,000 for any six-year
period.
Id. For more information, see Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT. RES.
CONSERVATION SERV. [hereinafter Environmental Quality Incentives Program], https://www.nrcs.usd
a.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (discussing the
eligibility requirements for EQIP).
129. The USDA Transition Incentives Program (TIP) offers retired or retiring owners two
additional rental payments beyond the term of the contract by leasing expiring CRP land to a beginning
or socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher. Transition Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/transition-incentives/index
(last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
130. See CONG. RES. SERV., R40763, AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION: A GUIDE TO
PROGRAMS 9, 12, 16 (2017) (highlighting a list of incentive programs; however, this list does not
mention other programs that may help reduce soil erosion coupled with other conservation objectives,
such as the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program and the Wetland Reserve Program).
131. Id.
132. Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programsand-services/conservation-programs/conservation-reserve-program/index (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
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States with 70 million acres of productive agricultural and forest land
enrolled in the CSP.133 The program pays producers for installing and
adopting new conservation practices and compensates producers for
improving, maintaining, and managing existing activities.134 The EQIP
provides financial incentives and technical assistance to help farmers and
landowners establish conservation practices and structures, and mostly
targets environmental concerns arising from livestock and poultry
production.135
2. Expand Funding and Enforcement for Certifications That Incentivize
Sustainability
Regulators can encourage sustainable practices by creating, funding,
and enforcing certification programs. The USDA Organic certification is
the best known sustainable certification.136 Developed in the 1990s and
created by the Organic Foods Production Act and the National Organic
Program, the USDA created standards for the production, handling, and
labeling of organic agricultural products.137
While sustainable agriculture is not organic agriculture by definition,
most consider organic agriculture to be an environmentally sustainable
system because organic agriculture requires less energy (e.g., pesticides).138
Moreover, organic products support sustainability in that they emphasize
the use of renewable sources, land management that maintains natural soil
fertility, water conservation, biodiversity, and long-term sustainability.139
Demand for these products is high: the market has almost quadrupled its
market share in the last decade, with sales of organic food growing from

133. Conservation Stewardship Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/po
rtal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/csp/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
134. CSP - Learn More, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailfu
ll/national/programs/financial/csp/?cid=nrcseprd1288524 (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
135. Environmental Quality Incentives Program, supra note 128.
136. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., USDA Reports Record Growth in U.S. Organic
Producers (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2016/04/04/usda-reports-recordgrowth-us-organic-producers.
137. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6503 (2012).
138. See Christopher T. Jones, The Manic Organic Panic: First Amendment Freedoms and
Farming or the Attack of the Agriculture Appropriations Rider, 26 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 423, 429
(2006) (“Environmental effects of conventional farming are legion, and some consumers, loath to
contribute to the possible environmental threats and harms, choose organic products as a result.”).
139. See Ann Plotto & Jan A. Narcisco, Guidelines and Acceptable Postharvest Practices for
Organically Grown Produce, 41 HORTSCI. 237, 287 (2006) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2014)) (discussing
soil benefits associated with organic farming).
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$3.6 billion in 1997 to over $39 billion in 2014.140 For the farmer, organic
products have economic benefits as they sell for more than their
conventional counterparts.141
Two criticisms of the USDA Organic program have emerged. First, not
all farmers are able to access the program because the USDA has not kept
up with the demand for this certification.142 Organic certification is
available to tenants, but only when the landowner has taken on the
responsibility of organic certification.143 However, leases can be written to
incorporate cost-sharing for organic certification.144 Farmers need to be
made aware of federal and state cost-sharing programs available for organic
certification. For example, “[t]he National Organic Certification Cost Share
Program (NOCCSP) is administered through the USDA and state agencies
and makes up to 75 percent of the costs for certification reimbursable.”145
Second, the infrequent nature of USDA Organic inspections has
allowed some agricultural producers to shirk their grazing requirements.146
The concern here is that, for growers who pay to certify USDA Organic, the
program needs to be enforced to prevent dilution of the expensive organic
certification.

140. STATE
OF
THE
INDUSTRY,
ORGANIC
TRADE
ASS’N
(2015),
https://www.ota.com/sites/default/files/indexed_files/StateOfOrganicIndustry.pdf.
141. A. Bryan Endres & Lisa Schlessinger, Pollen Drift: Reframing the Biotechnology Liability
Debate, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 815, 817 n.8 (2014) (discussing how processors and consumers are willing
to pay a premium for organic products).
142. See Stephanie Strom, Paying Farmers to Go Organic, Even Before the Crops Come In,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
14,
2016),
[hereinafter
Strom,
Paying
Farmers]
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/business/paying-farmers-to-go-organic-even-before-the-crops-co
me-in.html (noting that excess demand for organic products is more than certified organic producers can
grow, and that cost inhibitions make organic production financially impossible for some farmers).
143. See id. (describing the investment required by landowners in certifying their operation as
organic, such as spending significantly more in production costs to meet organic standards while selling
the crops at a conventional price until the 2- to 3-year certification period has ended).
144. See Ed Cox, Organic Certification on Leased Farmland, DRAKE U. AGRIC. L. CTR. (Mar.
15, 2011) [hereinafter Organic Certification], http://sustainablefarmlease.org/2010/11/assisting-withorganic-certification/ (providing information for landowners interested in assisting tenants with organic
certification).
145. Id.; see also Organic Cost Share Programs, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/occsp (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (highlighting the program’s
benefits).
146. See Peter Whoriskey, Why Your “Organic” Milk May Not Be Organic, WASH. POST (May
1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-your-organic-milk-may-not-beorganic/2017/05/01/708ce5bc-ed76-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.ca0fb472ff0b
(reporting that large milk producers often scheduled annual inspections with third-party inspectors
outside of the grazing season; meanwhile, reporters often observed very few cows ever grazing).
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3. Integrate Conservation Goals into Other Federal Programs
Other federal programs, such as the FSA Beginning Farmer programs,
can follow the lead of federal price-support programs, which condition
payments to tenants and landowners upon adherence to sustainable
practices.147 Beginning farm-ownership loan programs, such as the FSA’s,
can be tied to environmental stewardship by taking “the form of preferential
loan terms, debt forgiveness, debt for nature swapping, and/or advantageous
terms for capital associated with transition to organic or sustainable
practices.”148
The only problem with this is that these payments are subject to
congressional approval.149 While these federal programs incentivize owners
to adopt sustainable practices, members of Congress, as well as farm
organizations, have called for an end to direct subsidies in the 2012 Farm
Bill in favor of subsidized crop insurance, which does not have
conservation compliance provisions attached.150 “Therefore, the future
effectiveness of conservation compliance is uncertain.”151
4. Expand State-level Regulations and Incentives for Sustainable
Agriculture
Governments do not grow food, farmers do; but, government programs
support farmer decision-making. Various state-level initiatives incentivize
renters of land to adopt sustainable practices. Going back in time, the high
rate of tenancy and absentee landlords, which characterized the post-Dust
Bowl era, prompted states to pass laws requiring conservation of the soil.152
In 1937, the President’s Committee on Farm Tenure recommended that
states consider legislation to improve the farm tenancy situation.153 States
responded by passing laws favoring land ownership over leasing, including
147. See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Aspects of Farm Tenancy in Iowa, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 267,
311, 313 (1984) [hereinafter Legal Aspects] (discussing conditions for participating in federal pricesupport programs).
148. PARSONS, ET AL., THE FARMLASTS PROJECT:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FARMLASTS PROJECT RESEARCH REPORT 1, 7 (2010),
http://www.uvm.edu/farmlasts/projectexecutivesummary.pdf.
149. Funding, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/farm-loanprograms/funding/index (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
150. Kathleen Masterson, Farm Bill: Direct Payments to Farmers May Dry Up in 2012, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 4, 2011, 2:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2011/10/04/141047164/farmbill-direct-payments-to-farmers-may-dry-up-in-2012.
151. Conservation Law, supra note 128.
152. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
153. See Albert H. Cotton, Regulations of Farm Landlord-Tenant Relationships, 4 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 508, 508 (1937) (discussing the President’s Committee on Farm Tenure report).
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a ban on long-term leases in some states.154 Today, many statutes are in
place to preserve the soil, such as statutes on land tenancy, mandatory soilloss limits, crop-residue laws, duty of stewardship soil-conservation
statutes, duty of good husbandry statutes, as well as voluntary initiatives,
including the Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program
(the Minnesota Program).155 Most initiatives support tenants as well as
landlords in adopting sustainable land practices.
Iowa statutes, as well as relevant case law on land tenancy and
mandatory soil-loss limits, make Iowa a national model for giving basic
rights to tenants and for recognizing the public right to require landowners
to properly care for the soil. Many states adopted land-tenancy laws similar
to those found in Iowa, with statutes addressing notice and termination
procedures specifically for agricultural tenancies.156 In the 1970s, Iowa
developed mandatory soil-loss limits and laws aimed at property owners to
establish and maintain soil and water conservation practices, which were
enforced by commissioners of soil and conservation districts.157 “[I]n order
for a farm to remain eligible for USDA farm program payments,” the law
requires each district to establish soil-loss limits on highly erodible land “to
five tons per acre in a year,” which is “the maximum soil loss considered
sustainable . . . .”158 The State of Iowa also allows tenants the right to
remove crop residue and use it.159
Implied covenants of good husbandry, typically based on common
community practices, apply to agricultural leases in most states.160 While
these practices are able to provide some protection against harmful
154. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
155. See generally Huong N. Tran & Liu Chuang, State Conservation District Laws
Developments and Variations (U.S. Dep’t Agric., Working Paper No. 3, 1996),
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/de/home/?cid=nrcs143_014208#tables (detailing how
the Federal Dust Bowl soil conservation response evolved through the states to incorporate water
conservation); see also Neil D. Hamilton, Essay, Feeding Our Green Future: Legal Responsibilities and
Sustainable Agriculture Land Tenure, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 377, 389–90 (2008) [hereinafter Hamilton
Essay] (describing how Iowa’s duty of stewardship arises out of the state conservation district law).
156. See Legal Aspects, supra note 147, at 306 (collecting cases addressing tenancy laws); see
also McElwee v. DeVault, 120 N.W.2d 451, 453–54 (Iowa 1963) (establishing that a party can violate a
covenant of good husbandry by engaging in techniques that constitute poor cultivation practices and
reduce yields, and possibly even practices that produce excessive soil loss).
157. See Hamilton Essay, supra note 155, at 389–90 (noting that § 161A of the Iowa Code
enables the creation of Soil and Water Conservation Districts).
158. Conservation Law, supra note 128.
159. IOWA CODE § 562.5A (2018) (bestowing ownership of any above-ground portion of a plant
to farm tenants, unless the parties agrees to a different arrangement in writing, including corn-stalks,
stover, or any other residue from the plant); see also Slach v. Heick, 864 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App.
2015) (unpublished table decision) (citing IOWA CODE § 562.5A, and noting that it gives tenants a “right
to crop residue in the absence of a writing stating otherwise”).
160. COX, supra note 50, at 31.
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exploitation of a farm’s resources, they “[do] not necessarily guarantee the
adoption of sustainable practices . . . .”161 Iowa has not explicitly adopted an
implied covenant of good husbandry; however, an implied covenant is said
to exist because Iowa common law requires all tenants to use leased
property in a “proper and tenant-like manner” and not to commit waste.162
Also, the Iowa Supreme Court has established a duty of stewardship
regarding the state’s soil resources.163
The Minnesota Program is a voluntary opportunity for farmers
(including tenants) and agricultural landowners designed to accelerate
adoption of on-farm practices that protect Minnesota’s lakes and rivers.164
Launched in 2012 with $9 million in financial assistance to growers from
the USDA and the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Program operates
under a memorandum of understanding.165 The program offers producers
recognition, financial and technical assistance, and regulatory certainty,166 a
branding and marketing opportunity, check-up, and validation.167
Importantly, the Minnesota Program certifies land in tenancy. As per
the agreement, land comprising the agricultural operation is land that may
be possessed by ownership, written lease, or other legal agreement that the
producer operates.168 And, “[u]pon leasing any additional agricultural land
after the start date of this agreement, notify a certifying agent before
performing any farming practices on the additional land.”169 Also, a
producer need not make permanent alterations to the land.170

161. Id..
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program, MINN. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/awqcp (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (providing information about the
Minnesota Program).
165. Janet Kubat Willette, Water Quality Certainty Program Receives $9 Million, AGRINEWS
(Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.agrinews.com/news/minnesota_news/water-quality-certainty-programreceives-million/article_87c5b066-da36-5c28-89a2-0842f07f1a80.html.
166. See MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 164 (noting that any agency rules dealing with water
quality exempt those certified under the program).
167. BRAD REDLIN, MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, https://www.co.olmsted.mn.us/environmentalresources/commission/Docum
ents/MN%20Agricultural%20Water%20Quality%20Certification%20Program.pdf (last visited Apr. 23,
2018).
168. MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., MINN. AGRIC. WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION AGREEMENT,
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/mawqcp/mawqcpagreementx.pdf
(last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
169. Id.
170. According to the agreement, maintaining certification does not require producers “to
implement practices that permanently alter” the leased land’s landscape “if leased land is added after the
start date of [the] agreement [and] [p]roducer[s] . . . demonstrate, to the satisfaction of MDA [Minnesota
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The Program has been met with success. As of March 20, 2017, the
Program boasts 364 certified farms totaling over 211,033 certified acres,
implementing 628 new best management practices171 that have saved 8.5
million pounds of soil per year, reduced sediment by 6 million pounds per
year, and prevented 4 million pounds of phosphorus from entering our
water.172
B. Private Sector Recommendations
Private sector solutions begin with reforming private leases used
between landowners and tenants, and include creating more private
incentives through certifications, eco-markets, and conservation easements.
1. Reform Lease Contracts: Longer Leases
The lease contract between the landowners and farm operators
influences several farm operation decisions, such as production,
conservation, and access to land.173 Tenants advocate for long-term leases
and lease-to-own agreements to foster land security and to provide for time
to plan sustainable practices.174
Although the USDA Survey showed that most landlords have long
relationships with their tenants, most acres in lease agreements are
negotiated every year. “Seventy percent of acres rented from operator
landlords have been rented to the same tenant for over 3 years and 28
percent for over 10 years.”175 Non-operator landlords frequently have even
lengthier relationships with their tenants: “84 percent of acres have been
rented to the same tenant for over 3 years and 41 percent for over 10
years.”176 And yet, “57 percent of rented acres, accounting for 70 percent of
lease agreements, are renewed annually,” exhausting “considerable time
Department of Agriculture] or its agents, sufficient practices utilizing non-structural and nonpermanently landscape-altering management and conservation practices.” Id.
171. REDLIN, supra note 167.
172. Focus on the Farm Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Agric., 114th Cong. 384
(2016) (statement of Lee McDaniel, President, Nat’l Ass’n Conservation Districts) (providing data on
the Minnesota Program’s success, with statistics only through 2016); Steve Karnowski, Land O’Lakes,
Minnesota Partner on Water Quality Initiative, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 25, 2016),
https://apnews.com/e319c347f3314918a017109fcf97a552/land-olakes-minnesota-partner-water-qualityinitiative.
173. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 1.
174. See id. at 26, 40 (discussing different types of leases and lease programs, like rent-to-own,
and the advantages and disadvantages of these leases and programs to tenants).
175. Id. at iv.
176. Id.
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and effort . . . in managing and negotiating rental contracts.”177 The yearly
lease also has implications for sustainable practices.
Economic studies show that some renters do not have incentives to
invest in management or conservation practices that provide long-term
benefits.178 In light of the results showing that many tenants are in stable
tenant-landlord relationships, tenants may have greater long-term
conservation incentives than previously thought if tenant-landlord
relationships have lasted many years. In these situations, lengthening leases
or lease-to-own agreements may be viable options.
Other contract terms to be amended include leases that allow renters to
influence decision-makers on sustainable investments. The USDA Survey
found that owners make all of the decisions on short-term and long-term
sustainable investments, while renters provide all of the decision-making on
day-to-day activities and short-term planning.179 Another contract term that
can be established is to share conservation costs, which landlord
engagement should do, by lowering the cash-rental rate or selecting a sharelease (to distribute risk) so that costs and risks associated with required
conservation practices are not borne entirely by the tenant.
2. Reform Leases: Add Environmental Stipulations or Sustainability
Provisions
A lease outlines the terms of the contract granting an estate in land to a
tenant for a period of time, and the tenant pays for that right of possession.
Yet, the action in the lease is not in the conveyance provisions—it is in the
contract provisions. The contract provisions can serve as a mechanism to
enact policies regarding sustainable practices.
Many terms on the lease already bind tenants to conservation
measures. Since loss of soil through erosion and leaching of nutrients can
have severe consequences on the value of land for either sale or rental
purposes, typical leases contain clauses that address protection of soil and
water quality so that there is no noticeable degradation of soil or water
quality.180 When drafting a lease, the landlord and tenant discuss questions
such as what crops can be grown every year, where they can be grown, and
how much fertilizer and chemicals can be used (with livestock operations,

177. Id.
178. Soule, supra note 99, at 993.
179. Id.; USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at iv.
180. See, e.g., Legal Aspects, supra note 147, at 306–07 (discussing soil preservation as a
covenant in Iowa farm leases).
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consideration is to be given to the stocking rate and species).181 General
farming practices include: crop rotation; conservation tillage; no-till
farming; the use of buffer zones around bodies of water, terraces, and
ponds; the use of timber stands; the use of organic agriculture; whether to
have a dedicated wildlife habitat; and whether to qualify for a federal
CSP.182
Modern leases also insert sustainability clauses. For example, suppose
you are a farmer who rents public land in Boulder County, Colorado, and
profitably grow genetically modified beets with little incentive to plant
anything else. Boulder County is the largest agricultural landowner and
lessor of land, with some 25,000 acres of agricultural land in leases
administered by Boulder County Parks and Open Space.183 In 2011, the
Boulder County Commission, for the first time, voted to allow farmers to
plant GMO beets on leased public lands.184 In 2016, after much community
activism surrounding genetically modified crops, Boulder County updated
its Cropland Policy to phase-out genetically modified crops on rented land
for sustainability reasons.185 The Cropland Policy contains provisions
covering pesticide use and soil health and requirements of “best
management practices with respect to soil health and quality” (such as
conservation tillage, soil amendments, cover crops, residue management,
crop rotation, and rotational grazing).186 In addition, Boulder County
supports creating lease terms that encourage tenant investment in
infrastructure to enhance productivity and financial incentives for organic
agriculture.187 While it may not be possible to replicate this example in
another setting, especially on large commodity farms, some lessons can be
learned.188 The development of this model lease and cropland policy is a
potential solution to leases with sustainability clauses.
181. See id. at 270 (noting that an important lease component is “how the farm operation will be
conducted”).
182. See Sabine Zikeli & Sabine Gruber, Reduced Tillage and No-till in Organic Farming
Systems, Germany—Status Quo, Potentials and Challenges, AGRICULTURE, Apr. 2017, at 2, 9
(analyzing certain organic farming practices in Germany, specifically conservation tillage and no-till
farming).
183. Agricultural
Lands
on
Open
Space,
BOULDER
COUNTY,
http://www.bouldercounty.org/open-space/management/agriculture/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
184. Laura Snider, Boulder County Agrees to Allow Some GMOs on Public Land, DAILY
CAMERA (Dec. 20, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_19585517 (detailing the sugar
beet debate in Boulder, CO).
185. BOULDER CTY. PARKS & OPEN SPACE DEP’T, PARKS & OPEN SPACE CROPLAND POL’Y 26,
18 (Apr. 13, 2017), https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/boulder-countycropland-policy.pdf.
186. Id. at 17.
187. Id. at 13, 17–18.
188. Interview with Erik Johnson, in Boulder County, Colo., (Sept. 18, 2017).
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3. Industry Collaborations and Other Contracting Opportunities That Make
Sense
In theory, if a farmer—tenant or landowner—can be guaranteed a
higher premium for sustainably grown foods, they will be more likely to
adopt these practices. Traditionally, production contracts (“reached before
production begins under set compensation formulas, with the contractor
providing some inputs and owning the commodity from the outset of
production”) were the mechanism to lock in higher prices.189 To make
farms profitable—especially for tenants—farmers are finding new
opportunities to make economic use of their farmland.
In recent years, new land-related economic opportunities, such as the
development of carbon credit-related contracts, wind-energy development,
the sale of conservation easements for farmland protection,190 and long-term
conservation financing agreements, have proliferated.191 Ecosystem markets
allow landowners and farmers to receive payments for environmental
services, similar to the federal CSP program discussed earlier.192 Rather
than receive payments from the government, businesses in these markets
pay farmers for stewardship practices that mitigate environmental
degradation caused by the business, such as carbon emissions or water
pollution.193 These markets assign an economic value to ecosystem services
such as erosion control, flood buffers, and clean air.194 In some
circumstances developers are allowed to pollute or transform a valuable
habitat as long as the affected ecological services are offset through
separate habitat preservation, water conservation, or greenhouse gas
reductions.195

189. See Oppedahl, supra note 42, at 2 (“[T]he shares of corn, soybeans, and wheat marketed
under contract had grown to above 20% of their respective values of production in 2011. USDA data
also showed that in 2011, corn, soybean, and wheat farms that used marketing contracts tended to be
larger.”).
190. Memorandum from the Colorado Legislative Council Staff to Interested Persons (Aug. 28,
2017), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/conservation_easement_program_ip_memo_6052017.
pdf (“A conservation easement is a voluntary legal agreement that permanently preserves land for
certain public benefits, such as scenic or agricultural open space, natural habitat, recreational areas, or
historical sites.”).
191. Hamilton Essay, supra note 155, at 385.
192. James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 870, 888 (2005).
193. Conservation Law, supra note 128.
194. Salzman, supra note 192, at 887, 893.
195. MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY, ECOSYSTEM MARKETS AND FINANCE: A GLOBAL PRIMER 11–
12
(2015),
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/EcosystemMarketplace-Market-Primer-2015-Final.pdf; RICARDO BAYON, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE,
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Other revenue-generating tools, “private conservation initiatives”
(PCIs), have developed to encourage farmers to adopt conservation
practices, improve soil health, and address environmental issues such as
nitrate loss and climate change.196 The key here is that, while these
initiatives are for commodities only, most of these initiatives do not have to
be on owned land.197 And premiums are not guaranteed.198 A PCI has three
key aspects: (1) it involves private business; (2) it provides an economic
inducement (monetary or otherwise) for the producer; and (3) it is tied to
some market-driven, consumer-related sustainability claim.199 Examples of
Iowa-based PCIs include: (1) United Suppliers’ Sustain initiative using
Agren’s SoilVantage conservation planning component;200 (2) DuPont
Pioneer’s Memorandum of Understanding with USDA’s Natural Resource
Conservation Service Stover Harvest Collection Project;201 (3) POETDSM’s “Responsible Stover Harvest” initiative;202 (4) Iowa Seed Corn
Cover Crops Initiative;203 and (5) Field to Market: The Alliance for

BIODIVERSITY BANKING: A PRIMER 4–6 (2008), http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/biodiv
ersity-banking-a-primer/.
196. NEIL HAMILTON, EVALUATING HOW PRIVATE CONSERVATION MAY INCREASE FARMER
ADOPTION
OF
CONSERVATION
PRACTICES
1
(2017)
[hereinafter
EVALUATING PRIVATE CONSERVATION], https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&co
ntext=leopold_grantreports (describing a PCI as an agreement between a farmer and a consumer that is
practice-based and not outcome-based, and one that institutes conservation practices).
197. See generally Shannon Logan & Gerda R. Wekerle, Neoliberalizing Environmental
Governance?: Land Trusts, Private Conservation and Nature on the Oak Ridges Moraine, 39
GEOFORUM 2097, 2099 (2008) (describing the relationship of landowners and their land under PCIs).
198. Id.
199. EVALUATING PRIVATE CONSERVATION, supra note 196, at 2–3.
200. AGREN, REVOLUTIONIZING CONSERVATION DELIVERY: UNITED SUPPLIERS IS LEADING
THE WAY TOWARD PRIVATE SECTOR PLANNING (2014), https://www.agrentools.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/United-Suppliers-Case-Study.pdf.
201. See generally Soil Conservation Fights Land Erosion, DUPONT (May 16, 2017),
http://www.dupont.com/corporate-functions/media-center/featured-stories/may-2017/soil-conservationagriculture.html (describing no-till initiatives with corn producers); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric.,
USDA Announces New Conservation Collaboration with Dupont to Promote Sustainable Harvesting of
Bio-based Feedstocks for Cellulosic Ethanol (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.usda.gov/media/pressreleases/2013/03/29/usda-announces-new-conservation-collaboration-dupont-promote
(publicizing
initiatives between DuPont and the Natural Resource Conservation Service to promote sustainability);
Dupont Wins Sustainable Biofuels Award for Feedstock Innovation, DUPONT (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.dupont.com/products-and-services/industrial-biotechnology/press-releases/sustainable-biofu
els-award.html (recognizing DuPont for its award-winning sustainability project to reduce U.S.
dependence on fossil fuel).
202. BIOTECH. INNOVATION ORG., INDUSTRIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: A UNIQUE POTENTIAL FOR
POLLUTION PREVENTION 6 (July 2017), http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/BIO%20Industrial%20Bi
otech%20Pollution%20Prevention.pdf.
203. Iowa Seed Corn Cover Crops Initiative, IOWA SEED ASS’N (Apr. 12, 2016),
http://iowaseed.org/2016/04/12/iowa-seed-corn-cover-crops-initiative/.
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Sustainable Agriculture’s “Fieldprint” projects (including Unilever/Archer
Daniels Midland’s “Iowa Sustainable Soy Fieldprint Project”).204
The problem with these initiatives is that little evidence exists of direct
financial rewards for farmers.205 The Unilever Soybean program provides a
10¢-per-bushel premium to some growers in defined areas.206 The benefits
are not just financial, and farmers may be using the program to make claims
about sustainability.207
Finally, another example of industry-driven practices is the “Climate
Collaborative,” an initiative among more than 200 manufacturers, retailers,
distributors, and others who strive “to catalyze bold climate action among
natural products companies.”208 Member companies such as Annie’s are
experimenting with “regenerative farming practices like minimized tillage
and cover cropping, which help draw carbon underground.”209 In doing so,
they are part of “the Climate Collaborative’s Rooted Community carbon
farming action group,” sharing their practices with other companies
industry-wide.210 In 2018, food giant General Mills launched a program to
“verify the implementation of and measure quantitative results from onfarm practices that lead to three outcomes of interest: soil health,
aboveground biodiversity, and farmer economic resilience.”211 While many
of these programs are new and results have yet to be calculated, the fact that
farmers are adopting these alternative farming practices to satisfy their

204. Unilever/ADM Iowa Sustainable Soy Fieldprint Project, FIELD TO MKT., https://fieldto
market.org/projects/unileveradm-iowa-sustainable-soy-fieldprint-project/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
The data generated through a platform like the Fieldprint Calculator is the mechanism companies are
using to make claims of sustainability improvements. The Calculator gives growers an analysis of the
effectiveness of their cropping practices and their impact on land use, soil conservation, soil carbon,
irrigation water use, water quality, energy use, and greenhouse-gas emissions. Fieldprint Platform,
FIELD TO MKT., https://fieldtomarket.org/our-program/fieldprint-platform/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
205. EVALUATING PRIVATE CONSERVATION, supra note 196, at 2.
206. Sustainable Practices Make Cents for Iowa Farmers, UNITED SOYBEAN BOARD,
https://unitedsoybean.org/article/sustainable-practices-make-cents-for-iowa-farmers (last visited Apr.
23, 2018).
207. See David Gelles, Unilever Finds That Shrinking Its Footprint Is a Giant Task, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/business/unilever-finds-that-shrinking-itsfootprint-is-a-giant-task.html (documenting the beneficial press one Unilever farmer has experienced
since enrolling in the soybean program).
208. Press Release, Climate Collaborative, Leading Natural Products Companies Recognized
for Taking Action on Climate (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.climatecollaborative.com/ncg_ccawards_2018.
209. Press Release, Climate Collaborative, General Mills and Its Natural & Organic Brands Join
Annie’s in Forging Ahead on Climate Action (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.climatecollaborative.com/gen
eral_mills_announcement.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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upstream contracts suggests that supply chains are a leading motivator for
the adoption of sustainable practices.
4. Private Certifications
While some conservation practices are fixed by local, state, and federal
regulations, most conservation practices are voluntary. Farmers lock into
sustainability commitments in at least two ways: through private third-party
certifications and retailer supply-chain contracts.212
First, assisted by state-extension agents, seed companies, cooperatives,
and consumers, farmers navigate among a sampling of third-party
certifications: locally grown, organic, antibiotic-free, cage-free, hormonefree, GMO-free, and fair trade.213 The latest development is a certification
for regenerative agriculture—one that aims to exceed standards for organic
agriculture. 214
Many certifications address sustainability, several of which focus
on reduced pesticide use. A recent study conducted by the Consumer
Reports Food Safety and Sustainability Center215 examined pesticiderelated certifications.216 Among the published results, this study identified
labels the authors deemed “useful” (e.g., USA Organic,217 Certified
Naturally Grown, Demeter Biodynamic, Eco Apple, and Eco Stone Fruit)
because the labels were verified to prohibit all or nearly all pesticides.
Meanwhile, other standards are deemed “useless” (e.g., natural, pesticidefree, and Stemilt Responsible Choice) because the labels were not verified
or tested for pesticide residues.218 Finally, labels where it is “your call”
212. Jason J. Czarnezki & Katherine Fieldler, The Neoliberal Turn in Environmental
Regulation, 1 UTAH L. REV. 1, 23, 25, 32 (2016) (providing examples of labeling certifications, such as
the OFPA National Organic Program, Energy Star labels, and Vermont’s GMO-labeling program).
213. See Food Labels Explained, FARMAID, https://www.farmaid.org/food-labels-explained/
(last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (discussing the organic, certified, non-GMO project and grassfed
certifications).
214. Christopher Collins, Should ‘Regenerative’ Agreiculture Get Its Own Label?, CIVIL EATS
(July 10, 2017), https://civileats.com/2017/07/10/should-regenerative-agriculture-get-its-own-label/.
215. CONSUMER REP., supra note 4 (discussing the two types of pesticides—synthetic and
natural––and the USDA Organic certification standard).
216. See FOOD SAFETY & SUSTAINABILITY CTR., CONSUMER REPORTS, FROM CROP TO TABLE:
PESTICIDE REPORT 37–41 (2015), http://article.images.consumerreports.org/prod/content/dam/cro/news
_articles/health/CR_FSASC_FromCroptoTablePesticides_Mar2015.pdf. For each label, the authors
indicated if the label is verified and if it has standards that prohibit pesticides, limit pesticide use, or
require non-chemical or less-toxic pest-management practices. Id. The study also noted which, if any, of
the 18 high-risk pesticides were prohibited or restricted. Id.
217. Organic is verified by the USDA to prohibit nearly all synthetic pesticides, requiring that
the least toxic option is used first. Id.
218. Julia Westbrook, Useful (and Useless) Labels in Your Grocery Store, RODALE WELLNESS
(Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.rodalewellness.com/food/food-labels.
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(e.g., Rainforest Alliance, SCS Sustainably Grown, Whole Foods
Responsibly Grown, and “Food Alliance”) were “verified but less stringent
in their pesticide rules” than the “useful” labels.219
While third-party certifications can serve to incentivize sustainable
practices, this is not always the case. As large farming operations transition
to organic agriculture to capture the market of eco-consumers desiring more
sustainable practices, challenges to the USDA Organic label’s legitimacy
have arisen.220 With less than 1% of farmland in the U.S. certified organic,
and with organic sales accounting for approximately 4% of the market,
many object to the difference being made up with food imports.221 The
USDA Organic certification has also received criticism for not covering
animal welfare practices and for the variability in adoption of soil-fertility
techniques.222
Amidst this controversy, other certification programs are emerging to
prioritize organic farming practices and soil health, while assuring
farmworker and other rights.223 This new round of certifications could be
called: “Organic Plus” programs. The Regenerative Organic Certification,
for example, has emerged as a holistic agriculture certification
encompassing pasture-based animal welfare, fairness for farmers and
workers, and robust requirements for soil health and land management—
which admittedly stretch beyond U.S. standards for organic certification. 224
These certifications have the potential to help farmers (and their supply
chains) to meet sustainability and climate-change commitments for
increasing biodiversity, building soil, and sequestering carbon. Several
companies (i.e., DanoneWave, Patagonia Provisions, Maple Hill Creamery,
and Justin’s Nut Butter) are currently developing a pilot program to test
various systems.225 Instead of going through a third-party certification,
farmers can opt to contract directly with grocery stores that manage their
219. Id.
220. See Whoriskey, supra note 146 (describing how large organic milk producers can skirt
USDA certification standards).
221. Collins, supra note 214.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Regenerative Organic Certification, RODALE INST., https://rodaleinstitute.org/reg
enerativeorganic/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-4ni0o-V2gIVRJ7ACh1y8Q9_EAAYASAAEgJIs_D_BwE
(last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (“The goals of Regenerative Organic Certification are to increase soil
organic matter over time, improve animal welfare, provide economic stability and fairness for farmers,
ranchers, and workers, and create resilient regional ecosystems and communities.”).
224. See id. (announcing the Regenerative Organic Certification, and establishing its “three
pillars”: soil health, animal health, and social fairness); see also Rose Marcario, Join Us: The Journey to
Regenerative Organic Certification, PATAGONIA (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.patagonia.com/blog/201
7/09/join-us-the-journey-to-regenerative-organic-certification/ (describing how Regenerative Organic
builds upon USDA Organic while adding additional emphasis on soil health and sequestering carbon).
225. RODALE INST., supra note 223.
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own labels, such as the Whole Foods’ “Responsibly Grown” label.226 There
is great variance in grocers—some buy everything from vendors, some
import some products, some produce their own private label brands, and
some pursue all three. Consumers may not know that some supermarkets
engage in rigorous auditing of their vendors and that they place special,
higher food-safety requirements on their private labels.227 Most
supermarkets require audits from their growers and suppliers; if suppliers
do not pass an audit, the contract is dropped.228 As an organization develops
a sustainability strategy, it moves from first-party strategies (initiatives
pursued), to second-party strategies (certification schemes), to third-party
strategies (audits), and finally to fourth-party strategies (codes of
conduct)—though an organization may use all of these strategies.229
Private certifications represent a mechanism by which farmers produce
food to accommodate a private, third-party verified standard, or a private
retail standard, in an effort to generate additional revenue. The hope is that
certification programs, like the USDA Organic program, will succeed in
giving farmers a premium for organic production before and after their crop
is harvested. This means that other certification programs will provide
farmers with incentives similar to those that major food brands like General
Mills, Kellogg, and Ardent Mills provide to USDA Organic farmers.
“General Mills, for instance, recently signed a deal to help convert about
3,000 [conventional agriculture] acres to organic production of alfalfa and
other animal feeds,” while “Ardent offers farmers a premium for crops
grown on land while a farm transitions to organic.”230
V. CONCLUSION
This Article presented many solutions for incentivizing sustainable
practice adoption, while specifically addressing the pivotal role of tenant
226. Stephanie Strom, Whole Foods to Rate Its Produce and Flowers for Environmental Impact,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/business/whole-foods-to-rate-itsproduce-and-flowers-for-environmental-impact.html.
227. Konstantinos V. Kotsanopoulos & Ioannis S. Arvanitoyannis, The Role of Auditing, Food
Safety, and Food Quality Standards in the Food Industry: A Review, 16 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD
SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 760, 765 (2017).
228. Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Private
Law Making: Wal-Mart as a Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1752–55 (2007).
229. See JAMES M. WHITE & MICHAEL BOLAND, INVITED CASE STUDY AT THE 2015 AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. ASS’N & W. AGRIC. ECON. ASS’N JOINT ANNUAL MEETING: MAKING SUSTAINABILITY
TANGIBLE: LAND O’ LAKES AND THE DAIRY SUPPLY CHAIN (July 26–28, 2015),
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/206718/files/White.pdf (describing how the Land O’ Lakes
sustainable strategy fits into these four stages).
230. Strom, Paying Farmers, supra note 142.
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farmers in the food system. This is important given that tenancy is
forecasted to rise in the next twenty years, as farmers retire and more acres
move both into tenancy and into the hands of landlords with no farming
experience. Recommendations were provided for both regulators seeking to
promote sustainability (through federal, state, and municipal rules and
programs) and for farmers exploring sustainable practices (from negotiating
leases to private certifications and industry collaborations).
Outside of the solutions presented, work remains to be done in terms of
disseminating information between tenants, landowners who farm the land,
and landowners who own land with no background in farming per se. More
farm and agricultural extension-level programs need to develop curricula to
incorporate sustainable practices consistent with food safety goals or “comanagement” farming practices that promote food safety and sustainability.
There is also a need for more succession and farm-conservation planning
for landowners and tenants to encourage consideration of on-farm
conservation and productive land transfer for generations to come.
Finally, research on the price premium offered by certification
programs is necessary to show farmers that sustainable practices provide a
return on investment. In addition, an expansion of state legislative programs
favoring conservation (e.g., Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality
Certification Program) and industry collaborations that provide farmers
with funding to undergo organic certification (e.g., those by General Mills
and Ardent Farms) will be critical as farmers strive to adopt sustainable
practices.

